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Abstract— This paper presents a potential game-based
method for non-myopic planning of mobile sensor networks
in the context of target tracking. The planning objective is to
select the sequence of sensing points over more than one future
time steps to maximize information about the target states. This
multi-step lookahead scheme is studied to overcome getting
trapped at local information maximum when there are gaps
in sensing coverage due to constraints on the sensor platform
mobility or limitations in sensing capabilities. However, the
long-term planning becomes computationally intractable as the
length of planing horizon increases. This work develops a game-
theoretic approach to address the computational challenges.
The main contributions of this paper are twofold: (a) to
formulate a non-myopic planning problem for tracking multiple
targets into a potential game, the size of which linearly increases
as the number of planning steps (b) to design a learning algo-
rithm exploiting the joint strategy fictitious play and dynamic
programming, which overcomes the gaps in sensing coverage.
Numerical examples of multi-target tracking demonstrate that
the proposed method gives better estimation performance than
myopic planning and is computationally tractable.
I. INTRODUCTION
sensor networks have been successfully used to acquire
information about the quantities of interest spread over large
areas, including applications such as, monitoring spatial phe-
nomena, mapping, and tracking targets [1]–[6]. The mobility
of the sensor platforms certainly contribute to expanding the
sensing coverage and mission areas, the associate constraints
in mobility and sensor modalities necessitates resolution of
another crucial decision making on where and when to sense
with taking into account the constraints. The waypoints of
the sensor platforms need to be chosen to maximize the
information gain while satisfying all the associated resource
constraints.
Sensor planning schemes may be myopic or non-myopic
in terms of time domain. When we consider a set of sensing
locations for the next time step only, this approach is referred
to as greedy or myopic. This short term management has
given good performance in many tasks mentioned earlier
(e.g., sensor placements for monitoring spatial phenomena
[7], mobile sensor targeting for weather forecast [2], [3],
exploration path generation for simultaneous localization and
mapping [8], [9], sensor management for target tracking [5],
[10]–[13]. However, there are some situations in which non-
myopic strategies give poorer performance in the next step,
but better estimation accuracy at the end of the planning
horizon. In [6], [14], and [15], multi-step lookahead sensor
planning was shown to significantly improve the perfor-
mance for target tracking. Typically, when a sensor network
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contains ”sensor holes”, a greedy algorithm results in poor
performance [14]. The sensor holes are gaps in the sensing
coverage where the sensor network cannot make observations
of the targets. These invisible areas are caused by the limited
field of view of sensors or by the obstacles existing in
environments such as elevation difference of surveillance
region or by physical constraints on the sensor platform
motion. This is the case for tracking moving objects with
such sensors of a restricted capability. Non-myopic planning
can address this sensor hole issue by looking multiple steps
ahead in the future to extend candidate sensing regions.
This paper considers non-myopic planning for multi-target
tracking. Previous works on sensor planning for target track-
ing can be found in [1], [16]–[18], and resource manage-
ment for multi-function radar [11], [19]. Non-myopic sensor
planning is difficult because the number of possible sensing
sequences increases exponentially with the length of the
planning horizon. Exponential explosion in computational
time and memory usage follow for finding the optimal
sensing sequence. Several planning algorithms have been
proposed to reduce the computational costs. A simple but
suboptimal strategy is a greedy method that determines
sensing points in sequence, choosing the next location which
provides the maximum information gain conditioned on the
preceding sensing decisions [1]. Approaches to find the
optimal solutions can be found in [16], [17], [20]. The
methods used approximate cost functions and reduced the
computational burden by using pruning algorithms. Since the
sensor planning has the uncertain nature of the underlying
states, adaptive path planning problems have been formu-
lated as a Partially Observable Markov Decision Process
(POMDP) [21]. [22] designed the guidance algorithms for
controlling unmanned aerial vehicles by solving a POMDP
approximately. However, these more complex algorithms still
suffer from the computation cost, thus can deal with only the
limited size of the problems.
The work addresses the computational challenge by for-
mulating a non-myopic planning problem as a potential
game. The method is extended from the potential game
formulation that was proposed in the authors’ earlier work
[23], [24] for efficient selection of sensing points for the
next time step only. To formulate an optimization problem
into a potential game, we need to specify players, their
respective actions, their local objective/utility functions, and
the learning rules for the players [25]. In the game frame-
work of [24], each sensor in a sensor network represents
a player trying to maximize its utility function defined by
the conditional mutual information. This local utility design
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leads to a potential game, with a global objective being
the mutual information between the target states and the
measurement variables to be taken at the next time step. In
addition to our earlier work, there are more works using
game theory for distributed sensor network management.
For example, track selection for multi-target tracking in
a multifunction radar network has been made through an
anti-coordination game [11]. A radar in a network tries to
maximize the overall tracking accuracy criterion and a best
response based dynamics is presented to find an equilibrium.
In [26], the sensor management assigns moving sensors to
targets through a distributed sensor-based negotiation game.
Each sensor makes a decision locally that maximizes its
utility by negotiating with the neighboring sensors. In [27],
clusters of multistatic radars in a network select the opti-
mal waveforms maximizing the signal-to-disturbance ratio
through a potential game. The authors proved the uniqueness
of the Nash equilibrium using the discrete concavity property
of the proposed game. However, these game-theoretic ap-
proaches also have the same computational cost issue when
considering long-term planning, thus these studies handled
short-term management only.
To yield an efficient potential game method for informative
non-myopic planning, we modify the game framework in our
earlier work and propose a learning algorithm. In formulating
a sensor network planning problem into a potential game, we
take three steps: (i) specify the global objective function for
multi-target tracking, (ii) formulate the optimization problem
as a potential game. (iii) design a learning algorithm to
find a Nash equilibrium of the potential game. First, mutual
information is used as a global objective of a planning
problem. The quantities of interest are set to the target
states at the last time of the planning horizon to reduce the
computational burden. Then, a potential game is formulated
by defining a player as a sensor at each time step. A local
utility is defined by using the marginal contribution rule [24],
[28], it is shown to lead to a potential game with the mutual
information. Lastly, we propose a learning method to find
a solution of the designed game, which is extended from
the joint strategy fictitious play [29]. Dynamic programming
is used in the first run of the learning algorithm in order
to fill the gaps in sensing coverage caused by the limited
sensing capabilities and constraints on platform mobility.
Numerical studies on UAV coordination for optimal ground
target tracking are presented to demonstrate that the game-
theoretic mechanisms provide computational efficiency in
sensor planning over multiple time steps.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
While the game-theoretic method of cooperative planning
applies to many different applications with sensor networks,
here we illustrate the sensor planning in the context of multi-
target tracking.
In this section, we define a multi-target tracking problem
with a mobile sensor network and formulate a planning prob-
lem to find out the sensing locations to enhance the tracking
performance. First, the models of components comprising
Fig. 1: A sensor network planning problem for multi-target
tracking: A number of targets moving on the ground are
tracked by a sensor network. Every UAV (unmanned aerial
vehicle) is carrying a sensor which observes the targets at a
prespecified height.
the target tracking problem are defined, then a data fusion
method for planning is described briefly to represent the
conditional probability density function (pdf) of the target
state conditioned on the measurements.
The goal of a target tracking problem is to estimate the
kinematic states of targets with a finite set of measurements.
In general, the state estimation is performed via the Bayesian
filtering [30] which is a recursive algorithm consisting of
two processes: predicts the prior distribution of the target
states using the dynamic model of the target and updates the
distribution with sensor measurement model and taken mea-
surements. So, specific models of target dynamics and sensor
measurement are presented for the sake of concreteness.
However, note that the planning algorithms to be introduced
can be readily applied to other problems in which sensors
have a finite set of actions (i.e., sensing locations, sensor
modes) to select.
A. Target and Sensor Models
We consider a number of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
(UAVs) carrying sensors to track a group of targets on the
ground as shown in Fig. 1. To estimate the target states with
measurements, a sensor network keeps information about the
targets using a motion model and a prior distribution of the
states.
Let a set of targets moving on the ground to be T =
{1, 2, . . . ,M}. Here, we assume that the number of targets
are known and constant as M . The state of target j ∈ T
at time k is denoted by x(j)k = [x
(j)
k , y
(j)
k , x˙
(j)
k , y˙
(j)
k ]
T ,
where x(j)k and y
(j)
k represent the target position in two
dimensional Cartesian coordinates, and x˙(j)k and y˙
(j)
k are the
corresponding velocity components. We assume that each
target follows continuous white noise acceleration models
and moves independently from others, then it is possible to
ignore the joint distribution and use one tracking filter for
each target [31].
x
(j)
k+1 = Fkx
(j)
k + w
(j)
k (1)
where w(j)k ∼ N (0, Q(j)k ) is a white Gaussian process
noise, independent of the other targets and measurements. Fk
and Qk are system transition and process noise covariance
matrices, respectively. For the simulations in this paper, we
use a continuous white noise acceleration model.
Fk =

1 0 ∆t 0
0 1 0 ∆t
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
 ; Qk =

∆t3
3 0
∆t2
2 0
0 ∆t
3
3 0
∆t2
2
∆t2
2 0 ∆t 0
0 ∆t
2
2 0 ∆t
 q
(2)
where ∆T is the time between two successive measurements
at kth step to (k + 1)th step and q is the process noise
intensity, representing the strength of the deviations from
predicted motion by the dynamic model [32]. When q is
small, this model represents a nearly constant velocity. Note
however, the actual maneuver of the targets can be different
from the dynamics predicted by the sensor network. In the
simulations, we will show the effect of incorrectly fitted
models on performance of planning algorithms.
A sensor network is represented by a set of vehicles
N = {1, 2, . . . , N}, each vehicle is assumed to be equipped
with one sensor for simplicity1. For each sensor i ∈ N ,
the measurement taken at time k is denoted in a general
nonlinear form as
z
(i)
k = h
(i)
k (xk) + v
(i)
k (3)
where v(i)k ∼ N (0, Rik) is a white Gaussian noise process,
independent of the other measurement noises and of process
noise w(j)k , ∀k, ∀j ∈ T . xk is the set of states of targets
and a sensor network. More specifically, in a target tracking
problem, sensors usually measure the kinematic information
about the target relative to the sensor, itself. Thus the state
of the i-th sensor in xk includes position, orientation, and
velocity of the agent. Denoting the pose of i-th sensing agent
at time k as x(i)sk , the measurement model can be rewritten
to express the relative kinematic state of the target as
z
(i)
k = h(x
(j)
k , x
(i)s
k ) + v
(i)
k (4)
For the simulations in this paper, we set the measurement
model to a radar-like measurement, consisting of range and
azimuth to a target. At each time k, sensor i obtains the
positional measurement z(i,j)k = [r
(i,j)
k , φ
(i,j)
k ]
T for one of
the targets, j ∈ T :[
r
(i,j)
k
φ
(i,j)
k
]
=
[√
(xj − xi)2 + (yj − yi)2 + z2i
tan−1((yj − yi)/(xj − xi))
]
. (5)
1In this paper, we use a sensing agent, a sensor, and a sensing node
interchangeably. For simplicity, we assume that each vehicle have one sensor
on it. In general, some platforms can carry more than one sensor. In that
case, the sensing locations for the sensors equipped on the same vehicle
should match. Then the decision variables are for the vehicles not for the
sensors.
Fig. 2: Radar-like measurement model for target tracking.
(left) A sensor is mounted on an UAV and takes measure-
ments consisting of range and azimuth to the target. (right)
Sensors have limited sensing region, in which a target can
be detected and the relative position of the target can be
measured.
which is illustrated in Fig 2. For notational simplicity, the
discrete time index k can be dropped later. The superscripts
i and j represent the index of target and sensor, respectively,
in the rest of this paper. As shown in Fig. 2, sensors have
directivity, thus only the target inside the sensing region can
be detected and the sensor can obtain the information about
the location of the target within that area.
In radars it is shown that the signal to noise ratio (SNR)
dependent error is a major factor of the measurement error
[33]. An azimuth angle error can be modeled as a white
Gaussian noise with zero mean and standard deviation given
by
σφ ≈ θBW / cosψ
km
√
2SNR
(6)
where θBW is the 3dB beamwidth in the angular coordinate
and km is the monopulse pattern difference slope. In addition
to SNR, angular measurement error increases when targets
are located offset from the beam center due to a loss of
gain [32], which is reflected in the term cosψ. ψ is the
beam scan angle off-broadside. Similarly, a range error can
be represented as zero-mean Gaussian noise with standard
deviation given by
σR ≈ ∆R√
2SNR
(7)
where ∆R is radar range resolution.
To make the problem simple, three dimensional position
and heading angle x(i)s = [xi, yi, zi, θi]T of each sens-
ing agent i ∈ N are assumed to be known. There is
no uncertainty about the state of sensing locations. Thus,
the information about the target state can be obtained by
considering the probability distribution of the target and the
induced distribution of measurement variables2.
2If the sensor state is represented by a probability distribution over the
possible sensing locations, the distribution of the measurement variable
can be obtained from the observation model. The distribution of the
measurement variable usually spread more widely than when the sensor
state has no uncertainty, thus the less information about the target states is
contained in the measurement.
B. Estimation
Estimation of multi-target tracking is much harder than
single target tracking, because the number of targets varies
over time and the measurements need to be assigned to
tracks. These issues have their own importance in multi-
target tracking problems. However, in this paper, we aim
at proposing a planning algorithm to maximize information
about the states of moving targets. To focus on the algorithm
that decides the next sensing positions we assume that data
association is known perfectly and the number of targets to
track is known and fixed. With the assumption that each
target moves independently from the other targets, the single
filter for each target is sufficient to develop the planning
method.
The planning algorithm we propose can be applied with
various estimation filters. Here, for each target j, the tracking
process is performed by an Extended Kalman Filter (EKF).
In case of well defined transition models, the EKF has
been considered to be a practical means of nonlinear state
estimation [34]. Two types of targets are simulated for the
simulation in this chapter: a nearly constant velocity model
and a Dubins vehicle. When the sampling time is sufficiently
small, Dubins car models fit into the target dynamics in (2)
[15].
The EKF accomplishes the sequential estimation of the
mean and covariance through two stages: prediction and
update as follows [32]
– Prediction
State estimate: xk|k−1 = Fk−1xk−1|k−1
State covariance: Pk|k−1 = Fk−1Pk−1|k−1F ′k−1+Qk−1
Measurement: z¯k|k−1 = h(xk|k−1, xsk)
Innovation covariance: Sk = HkPk|k−1H ′k +Rk
– Update
Innovation: z˜k = zk − z¯k|k−1
Filter gain: Wk = Pk|k−1H ′kS
−1
k
State estimate: xk|k = xk|k−1 +Wkz˜k
State covariance: Pk|k = Pk|k−1 −WkSkW ′k
where Pk|k−1 and Pk|k are the prior and posterior error
covariance, respectively. Hk = ∂zk∂xk|k−1 is the linearized
measurement matrix evaluated at the predicted state xk|k−1.
Since the state variables are assumed to follow the normal
distribution, the induced variables from the dynamic model
and the measurement model also follow normal distributions
and the joint probability distribution of all the variables
including the target states and measurements are denoted by
multivariate Gaussian distributions. Therefore, the covariance
update formula is a representation of conditional covariance
matrix given the measurement variables. In the next section,
we will use the modified equation of covariance matrix con-
sidering the time step to calculate the amount of information
contained in the measurement variables.
III. NON-MYOPIC SENSOR NETWORK PLANNING
The variables of interest in target tracking is the whole
states of targets denoted by XT = {x(1), . . . ,x(M)}. The
goal of sensor network planning is to find out the se-
quences of sensing locations for a sensor network such that
information about the states of all targets is maximized.
Therefore, the objective function can be the quantity of
information about the targets’ kinematics at the instant of
interest. Sensor planning is called myopic when only the
states at the next step are considered. While myopic planning
has low computational costs and provides good performance
in many examples [5], [7], [35], it performs worse than
non-myopic scheduling in some cases. [14] shows that a
simple scenario with sensor holes can cause the performance
degradation in myopic planning. To overcome the problem
of greedy algorithm, a potential game based method that
considers the change over a multi-step lookahead horizon
will be provided.
A. Information-Maximizing Planning Framework
The goal of sensor planning for a target tracking problem
is to select the sequences of sensing decisions for the
next time steps that have the most information about the
target states. The information can be quantified by mutual
information, which is the difference between the entropy of
the target state and its conditional entropy conditioned on the
measurement variables [36]. Entropy is the measure of un-
certainty in a random entity. More specifically, (differential)
entropy of a continuous random variable with probability
density function fx(x) is defined as
H(x) , −Ex[log fx(x)] (8)
where Ex[·] denotes expectations over random entity x. The
conditional entropy is defined as
H(x|z) = Ez[H(x|z = z)] (9)
H(x|z) is an expected entropy of the conditional distribution
taken over all possible values of random variable z. It
represents a measure of uncertainty that will remain in x
on the average before the specific value of z is given. From
the definition of the conditional entropy we can compute the
expected reduction in uncertainty of the target states before
the new measurements are taken.
I(x; z) = H(x)−H(x|z) (10)
As shown in Fig. 1, there are N sensors in a sensor
network and M targets to track. We seek to maximize the
information about the states of targets at K steps later by
selecting the most informative sequences of sensing decisions
over the next K time steps. The global objective of a sensor
network can be represented by
max
ZN1:K
I(XTK ;ZN1:K) (11)
where XTK = {x(1)K , . . . ,x(M)K } is a set of random variables
representing all of the multi-target states at the last time step
of the planning horizon. ZN1:K = {z(1)1:K , . . . , z(N)1:K} represents
a sequence of predicted measurements to be taken by a sensor
network N over a K-step horizon. All the variables here
follow the probability distribution after updating with the
Fig. 3: Possible actions for a sensor: locations(left) and
heading angle(right), the shaded area in the right figure is
the field of view and the two arrows are the limit to rotation
of a UAV in one time step.
previous measurement history, and the time step k of the
subscript represents the relative time from the planning time.
Thus, the random variables change with the time at which
the planning decisions are made. Note that the variables
of interest is the states at the final time of the planning
horizon, not the sum of rewards resulting from each decision
stage. References [16] and [17] adopted the additive cost
considering also the cost at intermediate points in time.
Even though they showed the good performance for tracking
a single target, the summation could be computationally
expensive for multi-target tracking. Thus, we consider only
the terminal reward of a sensor sequence as our objective to
reduce the number of variables included in computing mutual
information. Also, since the final expected target states reflect
the intermediate condition of the targets, it is sufficient to
consider the mutual information about the final states only.
The quantity of information that each measurement has
about the targets depends on the sensing position and also
the heading angle due to the directivity of sensors. Since
a sensor can take one measurement at a time, we should
decide which target is to be observed. Therefore, there are
three decision variables for each measurement z(i)k , i ∈
N , k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K}, which are represented by a tuple:
a
(i)
k , [x, y, θ, j]
(i)
k . Here, (x, y)
(i)
k denotes the sensing
location for sensor i ∈ N at time step k. As shown in Fig.
3, the number of possible sensing locations at each time step
is finite and the set of sensing candidates is denoted by S(i)k .
For example, in the figure |S(i)k | = 17: stay at the previous
location or move one of 2 distances in one of 8 directions. In
the scenario for simulation, all the sensors are supposed to
fly at different heights and maintain their heights to prevent
collision between agents, thus z-coordinate is not a decision
variable. For heading angle of a sensor, there is a limit to
the heading angle that can be rotated in one time step, and
due to limited field of view of sensors the heading angle is
important for success of taking measurements. When it is
determined which target is observed, the best heading angle
to the target can be decided from the current pose so that it
does not exceed the limit of rotation. The heading angle is
considered as a function of the current sensor’s pose, next
sensing candidate location, and selected target’s estimated
position. Therefore, the pose of a sensor can be dropped out
of the decision variables. The optimization problem (11) can
be rewritten with the modified decision variables as
aN1:K
∗
= arg max
aN1:K
I(XTK ;ZN1:K) (12)
where aN1:K is the set of a
(i)
k for all i ∈ N , k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K}.
Each action for sensor i at time step k is denoted by a(i)k =
[(x, y), j] where j ∈ T and (x, y) ∈ S(i)k .
The above objective function for a multi-target tracking
problem can be simplified when the targets are assumed to
move independently of each other, because the state of each
target becomes independent of other targets.
Lemma 1: If each target moves independent of each other,
the objective function (11) can be rewritten as a sum of
information between each target and the measurements that
are taken from that target,
I(XTK ;ZN1:K) =
∑
j∈T
I(x(j)K ;ZNj,11 , . . . , ZNj,KK ) (13)
where Nj,k ⊂ N is a subset of sensors which decide to
observe target j at time step k. ZNj,11 , . . . , Z
Nj,K
K are the
set of measurement variables that are taken for target j
over the planning horizon of length K. Proof: The
above results can be easily induced by applying chain rule
of mutual information [36].
I(XTK ;ZN1:K) =
∑
j∈T
I(x(j)K ;ZN1:K |x(1)K , . . . ,x(j−1)K )
=
∑
j∈T
I(x(j)K ;ZN1:K)
Applying the chain rule to the measurement variables, then
mutual information for each target becomes
I(x(j)K ;ZN1:K) = I(x(j)K ;ZNj,11 , . . . , ZNj,KK )
This follows directly from that mutual information between
independent variables are zero and the measurement vari-
ables from other targets are also independent.
From the above lemma, the global objective can be ob-
tained by considering information terms separately for each
target.
B. Potential Game Formulation
In [24], we presented a potential game approach for
selecting the informative sensing points over the next time
step and showed that the proposed method can achieve
close-to-optimal solution quality by exploiting a systematic
decision update procedure of a potential game. In this
section, we will extend the game-theoretic framework for
cooperative selection to non-myopic sensor planning that
decides sensing points over several time steps. Before stating
the potential-game formulation for non-myopic planning, a
brief introduction to the basics of a potential game will be
given first.
A general strategic form game consists of a finite set of
players P = {1, 2, . . . , L}; each player i ∈ P has a finite
action set Ai that the player can select, and has a preference
structure over the actions according to its utility (payoff)
function ui : A → R. A =
∏
i∈P Ai is a set of all possible
combinations of actions for all players to choose at a time.
a = (a1, a2, . . . , aL) ∈ A is the collection of strategies of all
players, called a strategy profile, where ai ∈ Ai denotes the
strategy chosen by player i ∈ P . For notational convenience,
a−i = (a1, . . . , ai−1, ai+1, . . . , aL) denotes the collection of
actions of players other than player i. With this notation, a
strategy profile is expressed as a = (ai, a−i).
A potential game is a non-cooperative game in which
the incentive of the players changing their actions can be
expressed by a single function, called the potential function.
That is, that the player tries to maximize its utility is equiva-
lent to maximizing the global objective global objective [37].
Definition 1 (Potential Games): A finite non-cooperative
game G = 〈P, {Ai}i∈P , {ui}i∈P〉 is a potential game if
there exists a scalar function φ : A → R such that
ui(a
′
i, a−i)− ui(a′′i , a−i) = φ(a′i, a−i)− φ(a′′i , a−i) (14)
for every i ∈ P , a′i, a′′i ∈ Ai, a−i ∈ A−i. The function φ is
referred to as a potential function of the game G.
The property of a potential game in (14) is called perfect
alignment between the potential function and the player’s
local utility functions. In other words, if a player changes its
action unilaterally, the amount of the change in its utility is
equal to the change in the potential function.
Potential games have two important properties due to the
utility alignment [38]. First one is that the existence of pure
strategy Nash equilibrium is guaranteed. Since in a potential
game the joint strategy space is finite, there always exists
at least one maximum value of the potential function. This
strategy profile maximizing the potential function locally or
globally is a pure Nash equilibrium. Hence, every potential
game possesses at least one pure Nash equilibrium.
Definition 2 (Nash Equilibrium): A strategy profile a∗ ∈
A is called a (pure) Nash equilibrium if
ui(a
∗
i , a
∗
−i) ≥ ui(ai, a∗−i) (15)
for every ai ∈ Ai and every player i ∈ P .
The second important property is about the dynamics of
a game. Learning algorithm is a process finding out a Nash
equilibrium by repeating a game. Many learning algorithms
for potential games are established and proven to have
guaranteed asymptotic convergence to a Nash equilibrium
[39].
A potential game approach for sensor planning problems
is to design the components of a game while satisfying
perfect alignment [39]. In [24], we set each sensing agent as
a player participating in a game and adopted a conditional
mutual information as a local utility function. When the same
player concept is applied to non-myopic planning game, it
causes some computational burden. In case of L sensing
allowable options for each step, there are a total of LK
distinct sensing sequences of length K, resulting in a total
of LK ×MK actions for each player. A participant then has
an exponentially increased number of action strategies with
the length of planning horizon. Thus, it is computationally
intractable to calculate the utilities for all the different
sensing selections. To address this problem, we set a sensor
at each time step as a player, yielding a total of N × K
players each having a strategy space S(i)k × T . If all the
sensing agents have the same possible moving options, the
number of actions for each player to consider is constant
with the number of time steps the algorithm looks ahead.
Instead of exponential increase in a number of actions for
each player, this specification of players linearly increases
the number of participants of a game. In summary,
• The players are the sensors at each time step represented
by the set P , N × K, where K = {1, . . . ,K} is
the set of time steps that the planning algorithm looks
ahead. Each player is denoted by a 2-tuple [i, k], where
i ∈ N , k ∈ K
• The strategy space of each player is represented by the
set A(i)k , S(i)k × T for each player (i, k) ∈ P . The
action which player [i, k] can select is denoted by the
tuple a(i)k , [(x, y), j], where (x, y) ∈ S(i)k is one of the
possible sensing locations to which sensor i can move
at time step k. The candidate positions are constrained
by the sensor’s moving capability such as maximum
speed. The action set for player [i, k] corresponds to the
decision variables for measurement z(i)k as explained in
the previous section.
A graphical model of the state and measurement variables
and the players for a potential game formulation is depicted
in Fig. 4.
As proposed in [24], the conditional mutual information
conditioned on other players’ decisions is considered as a
local utility for each agent
u
(i)
k = I(XTK ; z(i)k |Z−[i,k]) (16)
where Z−[i,k] is the collection of measurements of players
other than player [i, k]. As independence between the target
states and the measurements from other targets simplifies the
mutual information defined as a global objective, the local
utility can be rewritten in a simpler form.
u
(i)
k =
∑
j∈T
I(x(j)K ; z(i)k |Z−[i,k]) (17)
Since each sensor take measurements of one target at a
time, the above expression for a local utility becomes
u
(i,j)
k (a
(i)
k , a−[i,k]) = I(x(j)K ; z(i,j)k |Z(j)−[i,k]) (18)
which represents utility value when player [i, k] selects
target j for the next measurements. Z(j)−[i,k] represents other
measurement variables which are taken for target j. Using
zero mutual information between two independent variables,
the above expression can be easily derived. Therefore, it is
sufficient to consider the measurements of sensors which
select the same target when each player computes its utility
values for a specific target selection over possible sensing
locations.
Fig. 4: A graphical model with a proposed game design of a multi-target tracking problem in which each target moves
independent of each of the targets. A rectangle represent a player in the potential game formulated for cooperative sensor
network planning.
Lemma 2: With local utility function defined as (17) the
distributed procedure leads to a potential game with a global
objective (potential function) as
φ(a
(i)
k , a−[i,k]) = I(XTK ;ZN1:K)
Proof: Follows directly from Lemma 1 and the proof
of Lemma 1 in [24].
IV. LEARNING ALGORITHM FOR NON-MYOPIC SENSOR
PLANNING
With the proposed utility function, the designed potential
game is solved by a process called a repeated game, in
which the same set of games is played over and over again
while adapting the decisions of players to updated set of
information. At each play in a repeated game, every agent
chooses an action according to a specific rule (such as
fictitious play, better/best response and log-linear learning
[40]), which is generally represented as a probability dis-
tribution over the player’s actions set. In [24], we adopted
the joint strategy fictitious play (JSFP) for finding out Nash
equilibrium in a myopic sensor network planning problem
formulated as a potential game. In this section, we will
present learning dynamics that exploits the same learning
framework as in our previous work. First, we review the
basic concept of JSFP summarizing brief description of [24].
Next, we introduce the extended learning algorithm to non-
myopic planning and analyze the computation complexity to
perform the procedure.
A. Joint Strategy Fictitious Play
In the fictitious play based algorithms, each players pre-
sumes that the opponents choose the action according to the
empirical frequency of play. Especially in JSFP, a player
keeps track of the joint actions of all others and computes an
expected utility based on the joint empirical frequency [29].
Let f−i(a−i; t) be the frequency with which all players but
i have selected joint action profile a−i up to the t−th play.
Then the expected utility for action ai ∈ Ai is given by
ui(ai; t) = Ef−i(t)[ui(ai, a−i)]
=
1
t
t−1∑
τ=1
ui(ai, a−i(τ))
where ui(ai, a−i(τ)) is the utility computed for ai ∈ Ai and
the joint actions of others a−i(τ) selected at the previous
play τ . In [29], Marden et al gave the simple expression for
the expectation ui(ai; t) as
ui(ai; t) =
t− 1
t
ui(ai; t− 1) + 1
t
ui(ai, a−i(t− 1))
This recursion form reduces computation complexity sig-
nificantly compared to the traditional fictitious play based
on empirical frequencies of marginal actions [24]. Also,
with some notion of inertia, i.e., a probabilistic reluctance
to change actions, JSFP was shown to converge to a pure
strategy Nash equilibrium [ [29], Theorem 2.1].
Algorithm 1 JSFP-BASED DOUBLE LOOP LEARNING FOR NON-MYOPIC SENSOR NETWORK PLANNING
INPUT: target states: {x(1)0 , . . . ,x(M)0 }, state covariances: {P (1)0 , . . . , P (M)0 }, sensors’ pose: {x(1)s0 , . . . ,x(N)s0 }, α ∈ (0, 1)
1: Predict target states and covariances {x(1)1:K|0, . . . ,x(M)1:K|0}, {P (1)1:K|0, . . . , P (M)1:K|0}
2: Initialize Nj,k = ∅, ∀j ∈ T , for k ∈ K
3: Convergedout = FALSE
4: while ¬ Convergedout do
5: for k ∈ {K, . . . , 1} do
6: S
(i)
k = generate sensing locations at time step k, for each i ∈ N
7: Update covariance matrix {P (1)K|N1,−k , . . . , P
(M)
K|NM,−k}
8: Initialize u¯(i,j)k to zero vector
9: Exitin = FALSE
10: t := 0
11: while ¬ Exitin do
12: if rand() > β then
13: Exitin = TRUE
14: end if
15: t := t+ 1
16: for i ∈ N do
17: u
(i,j)
k = compute utility values at time step k, for each (x, y) ∈ S(i)k and j ∈ T
18: u¯
(i,j)
k :=
t−1
t u¯
(i,j)
k +
1
tu
(i,j)
k
19: end for
20: for i ∈ N do
21: [(x, y), j]∗(i,k) = arg max(x,y)∈S(i)k ,j∈T
u¯
(i,j)
k
22: if rand() > α ∧ ¬ Exitin then
23: a
(i)
k = [(x, y), j]
∗
(i,k) update strategy to the optimal decision.
24: end if
25: end for
26: Exitin = check convergence of inner game
27: end while
28: Update Nj,k from a
(1)
k , . . . , a
(N)
k
29: end for
30: Convergedout = check convergence of outer game
31: end while
B. Learning Algorithm with JSFP
In [24], we applied JSFP algorithm to obtain a solution of
a myopic sensor planning problem. The previously proposed
JSFP method was simple in that the method does not need
to consider a kinematic constraint of a mobile sensor over
multiple time steps. It is sufficient to consider the set of next
possible sensing locations only, which is unchanged during
a repeated game. However, when considering the path over
more than one time step, the k-th possible sensing locations
and heading angles are subject to the previous and next
pose of the sensing platform. Therefore, we should reflect
changing reachable candidates at each time step in a learning
algorithm.
Another difficulty in non-myopic planning is sensor holes.
For example, when a sensor has a limited field of view and
all targets locate out of view at the planning time and in
one time step later, a greedy method can get trapped at local
maximum [14]. Extending the candidate region to the K-step
reachable region, this sensor hole problem can be addressed.
Since a mobile platform can reach any locations inside the
farthest points reachable by K movements, it is enough to
define the set of possible sensor configuration options for
the Kth step candidates as the region including the farthest
points and inside that boundary.
A non-myopic learning algorithm to be presented starts
a repeating game from the last time step K. Player [i,K]
for each i ∈ N first selects the optimal position as an
initial action within K-step reachable region by solving
local greedy method. This initialization scheme continues to
(K−1)th step with conditioning pdf of variables conditioned
on the Kth decisions. After converging to the solution for
each time step, the algorithm goes back to the previous time
step until the one step lookahead decision. This initialization
planning method is similar to dynamic programming.
In Algorithm 1, the learning algorithm for non-myopic
planning is summarized. There are two while loops: outer
and inner. The inner loop corresponds JSFP for a potential
game considering k-th step only. The inner loop terminates
according to the following rules:
• If JSFP converges to a Nash equilibrium, the decisions
for k-th step are made with those optimal sensing
locations.
• Otherwise, the loop terminates with probability 1 − β,
β ∈ (0, 1).
where β represents the willingness to optimize at time
step k. According to these rules, players try to optimize
their decisions with probability β and will stay with the
previous action with probability 1 − β at each repeated
game. This nonzero inertia term is required to avoid cycling
in local search [29]. After the inner loop terminates, the
selected decisions are stored in Nj,k’s which are used for
updating the covariance matrix. The outer loop is performed
recursively until all of the decisions are not changed over a
repeated game. Since the algorithm is a variant of JSFP, it
can be proved that the algorithm with inertia almost surely
converges to a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 1: Algorithm 1 with α ∈ (0, 1) and β ∈ (0, 1)
almost surely converges to a pure strategy Nash equilibrium
of the potential game in Lemma 2, with consistent tie-
breaking in all the arg max operations involved in the
process.
We provide a proof of Theorem 1 in Appendix. The structure
of Algorithm 1 is similar to fading memory JSFP with inertia,
because the utility values are not stored through an outer
loop. The utility u¯(i,j)k is initialized to zero vector every time
an inner loop ends. Therefore, we will prove Theorem 1 by
following a structure to the proof of Theorem 3.1 in [29].
C. Calculation of Utility Functions
This section explains how to compute the utility values
in Algorithm 1 and analyzes its computation cost. In the
previous section, the local utility function for a multi-target
tracking problem is defined as (17). When the dynamics and
measurement models are linear and Gaussian, the mutual
information objective of a normal distribution relates to its
covariance matrix only.
I(x(j)K ; z(i,j)k |Z(j)−[i,k])
= H(z(i,j)k |Z(j)−[i,k])−H(z(i,j)k |x(j)K , Z(j)−[i,k])
=
1
2
log
(∣∣∣P (z(i,j)k |Z(j)−[i,k])∣∣∣)
− 1
2
log
(∣∣∣P (z(i,j)k |x(j)K , Z(j)−[i,k])∣∣∣) (19)
where P (z(i,j)k |Z(j)−[i,k]) and P (z(i,j)k |x(j)K , Z(j)−[i,k]) represent
the conditional covariance matrices of z(i,j)k conditioned
on Z(j)−[i,k] and additional x
(j)
K , respectively. When P (x, z)
represents the covariance between x and z, the conditional
covariance matrix for a Gaussian can be computed as
P (x|z) = P (x)− P (x, z)P−1(x)P (z,x). (20)
From the above equation, we need the covariance matrix
relating three variables x(j)K , z
(i,j)
k and Z
(j)
−[i,k] to compute the
utility (19). Here, x(j)K represents the a priori state estimate
predicted at the planning time, then
x
(j)
K = x
(j)
K|0 = F
(j)
K x
(j)
0
For notational simplicity, we will omit the superscript (j)
specifying the target in this section, then all the variables
here are for the single target j. Likewise, the measurement
variables to be taken at time step k are induced from
the a priori estimate x(j)k|0. From target dynamics (1) and
measurement model
xk = xk|0 = Fkx0 + wk
z
(i)
k = h(xk|0,x
(i)
k ) + v
(i)
k
The measurement noise v(i)k is a zero mean uncorrelated
Gaussian process with covariance R(i)k and is uncorrelated
with any other sensor noise as well as the state variables
and the process noise. The covariance matrix are computed
as follows,
P (xk,xk) =FkP0F
′
k +Qk for k ∈ K
P (z
(i)
k , z
(i)
k ) =H
(i)
k P (xk,xk)H
(i)
k
′
+R
(i)
k for k ∈ K
P (z
(i)
k ,xK) =H
(i)
k P (xk,xk)F
′
K−k
P (z
(i)
k , z
(i)
l ) =H
(i)
k P (xk,xk)F
′
l−kH
(i)
l
′
for l < k
where Fl−k is system transition matrix from time step k to l
as defined in (2) with appropriate time interval between two
time steps. The elements in the covariance matrix related
to the target states P (xk,xk) can be obtained prior to
executing the learning algorithm for solving the potential
game. Predicting the covariance matrices of the target states
from k = 1 to k = K requires O(K). There are two
types of the measurement variables in (19). While z(i,j)k
is the measurements for a sensing candidate at the current
game, Z(j)−[i,k] are the measurement variables selected at the
previous game. Before starting each game in a repeated
game, the terms related to the measurement variables can
be computed and the resulting conditional covariance matrix
P (z
(i,j)
k |Z(j)−[i,k]) and P (z(i,j)k |x(j)K , Z(j)−[i,k]) are obtained.
The maximum size of Z(j)−[i,k] is (N − 1)(K − 1). Since
inversion of a n × n symmetric positive matrix requires
O(n3) flops and a determinant computation using Cholesky
factorization needs O(n3) flops [41], the resulting com-
putation time for obtaining a set of utility values of one
agent is O(N3K3) +O(L). After obtaining the conditional
matrix, computing each utility value requires constant time,
resulting in O(L) because the size of z(i,j)k is constant (2
for this scenario). In a repeated game, the prediction of the
target states is done once, on the other hand, the conditional
covariance matrix is computed every game step. Therefore,
the overall computing time is approximated as O(N3K3) if
L is fixed. Compared with myopic planning (K = 1), the
calculation time increases polynomially to the length of the
time horizon.
V. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
To compare the performance of a new algorithm with a
greedy method, a scenario with sensor holes is presented.
There are five targets moving on the ground. The map size
is approximately 600×600. Three of targets go straight with
Fig. 5: One example of multi-target tracking scenario, in
which (red, green, and blue) squares move in nearly constant
velocity and the other two squares follow Dubins vehicle
model.
Fig. 6: Measurement error term of a radar-like sensor. A
sensor locates at (0,0, 490) and points to the positive x-axis
slightly looking down.
nearly constant velocity and change their speed sign when
the target crosses the map boundary. The remaining two
targets are modeled as Dubins vehicles which have a fixed
forward velocity with a bounded turning radius. One example
of this scenario is shown in Fig. 5 (red, green, blue: nearly
constant velocity model. magenta, yellow: Dubins vehicles).
The reason there are two types of target movements is to see
the performance difference between a well predicted model
and a poorly matched model. A multi-step lookahead sensor
planning is expected to outperform short-term methods in
situations where the dynamics of targets are predictably
changing, but to give poor performance in cases where the
dynamic model is not matched to a real target dynamics. A
target model applied to EKF is close to a nearly constant
velocity model, while Dubins vehicles are not fit into that
dynamics.
For sensor platforms, we consider a set of quadrotors
moving at different heights from each other to alleviate
collision avoidance constraints. In a scenario for simulation,
there are three platforms, each of which is equipped with
one radar-like sensor. The sensors are mounted at a slight
angle to look down. The standard deviations of measurement
noise are depicted in Fig. 6, in which a sensor is located
Fig. 7: Mutual information with varying target location on
the ground.
500 high from the ground and (x, y) = (0, 0). Fig. 7 depicts
the mutual information that can be obtained when a ground
target is located with respect to the sensor. The coordinates
of the sensor are (0, 0) and the sensor is oriented towards
the positive x-axis as shown in Fig. 6.
The proposed non-myopic planning is realized in two ways
as [16]. The first is open-loop planning (OL), in which
the planning is performed after all the planned decisions
are exhausted. The second is open-loop feedback (OLF),
which is same as rolling horizon planning. In OLF, the first
some part of decisions is executed, and then a new plan
for the following K steps is generated, having updating the
covariance matrices and the state variables. To overcome
the sensor hole problem and prevent the divergence of the
filter, the decisions are made every two time steps and take
measurement of the same target as the previous one in the
intermediate time step. Thus, K = 2 corresponds to myopic
planning, which finds out the optimal sensing actions in
two steps and the same target is observed for two steps.
We ran 100 simulations using both non-myopic planning
schemes. For each run, the states of targets and the positions
of the sensors are randomly initialized. Figs. 8 and 9 present
a comparison between myopic planning and two different
non-myopic planning methods. As expected, when the target
dynamics is predicted the real target movements well, the
performance of non-myopic planning is better than myopic
planning (See Fig. 8). On the other hand, when the dynamic
model for the target state is not fit into the actual movement
of the target, non-myopic planning (OL) gives poorer per-
formance (See Fig. 9) than a greedy method. However, the
open-loop feedback planning overcomes the nonlinearity of
the target dynamics and gives the best performance of all the
planning methods.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have investigated a potential game ap-
proach to long-term sensor network planning. Since the non-
myopic optimization problem requires exponentially increas-
ing computation time as the length of the planning time
horizon increases, a player for a potential game is needed
Fig. 8: Comparison of the RMSE of the target position for
nearly constant velocity target
Fig. 9: Comparison of the RMSE of the target position for
Dubins vehicle target
to be defined differently from the myopic case to keep
the size of the problem manageable. Accordingly, a new
learning algorithm was proposed combining dynamic pro-
gramming and JSFP. To demonstrate the performance of the
non-myopic planning method, we considered a multi-target
tracking problem involving sensor holes due to constrained
mobility of platforms and limitations on sensor visibility.
The numerical simulations showed the effectiveness of the
proposed approach and the conditions in which non-myopic
planning gives better performance than myopic planning.
APPENDIX. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
According to [29], for the proof of convergence it is
sufficient to show that there exists a non-zero probability,
∗ > 0, such that the probability of convergence to an
equilibrium by finite time t∗ is at least ∗. Since ∗ does
not depend on the stage t of a learning, this will imply that
the action profile converges to an equilibrium almost surely.
In [29], the proof of fading memory JSFP with inertia
relies on the fact that if the current action profile is repeated
a sufficient number of times (finite and independent of time)
then a best response to the empirical frequencies becomes
equivalent to a best response to the current action profile
and hence will increase the potential provided that there is
only a unique deviator. This will always happen with at least
a fixed (time independent) probability because of the inertia.
The outer loop of the proposed learning algorithm considers
the most recent information only. That is, the outer structure
of the learning rule is fading JSFP with inertia considering
the very previous decisions only. Thus, an outer loop with the
same action profile does not need to be repeated. If there is a
probability that one player changes its decision unilaterally to
optimize its decision, the proof will be completed. Due to the
parameter β and the inertia term α of JSFP in an inner loop,
this unilateral best response will always happen with at least
a fixed probability. Thus, the iterative procedure is proven to
converge to a pure strategy Nash equilibrium almost surely
as in the proof of the Theorem 3.1 in [29].
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